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ABSTRACT 
The strategic condition of the world is characterised by the fact that pre-emptive military 
action may be necessary. This condition is based on the realisation that legitimate national 
governments have lost their monopoly on the use of force while determined individuals and 
groups of individuals can lay their hands on weapons with which they can inflict huge, even 
irreversible damage to entire societies. Assuming that pre-emptive military action is here to 
stay and we should be determined not to let it escape democratic control. This paper seeks the 
procedures and checks that should be in place if pre-emptive military action is to be firmly 
embedded in democratic practices and institutions. To that end, it reviews the application of 
the precautionary principle in the environmental and food safety domains and assesses 
whether the procedural checks and practices used there can also have their utility in the 
international security domain. 
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Introduction 
The apparent problems of the administrations or President George W.  Bush and  Prime 
Minister Tony  Blair to  provide evidence legitimising the war in Iraq may erode public 
confidence in the role of the executive, one of the most important democratic institutions. 
When v iewed in this light, the fallout from the war in Iraq may be as grave as the war itself. 
Yet, a  strategic condition has developed in which pre-emptive military action may be 
necessary. This condition is based on the fact that legitimate national governments  have de 
facto lost their ‘monopoly on the use of force’. Today, determined individuals or groups can 
lay their hands on weapons with which they can inflict huge, even irreversible damage to 
entire societies. The purpose of this paper is not to engage in the debate about whether pre-
emptive military action in itself is justified  – we accept that in some cases pre-emptive 
military action is justified. Rather,  we look at the procedures and checks that should be in 
place if pre-emptive military action is to be firmly embedded in democratic practices and 
institutions. To that end, we review the application of the precautionary principle used  in the 
environmental and food safety domains and assess whether the procedural checks and 
practices applied there can also have their utility in the international security domain.  
At first sight, this approach may seem implausible or unfeasible to some; nevertheless, we 
believe that it is supported by a number of good reasons. The application of the precautionary 
principle has become common ground in the European Union in recent years and is used in an 
increasing number of policy domains. A previous CEPS publication on the impact of the 
precautionary principle on international trade relations concludes that “precaution is here to 
stay” and urges that “ [given] the nature of international economic interdependence 
(globalisation) and the linkages that exist between environmental and food safety issues, there 
is a pressing need to develop more extensive criteria for the application of precaution or the 
precautionary principle” (Woolcock, 2002, pp. 26-27). Other literature asserts that the 
precautionary principle provides the basis for “acting in advance of scientific proof of harm to 
address uncertain but potentially significant risks” (Jorden and O’Riordan, cited in Woolcock, 
2002, p. 6). The precautionary principle may offer some  interesting insights, because the 
food-safety domain and the security domain share an important similarity: the risks within 
these policy domains are uncertain to the point of being unknown. In both domains, risks and 
threats may constitute a danger to people and – if no action is taken or these threats are left 
unchecked – the danger may grow. This may result in a situation in which inaction may be a 
problematic, irresponsible policy option. 
Yet  the risks and threats in the security domain can result in much greater and more 
immediate harm for societies as a whole than most environmental issues, which makes 
observance of the precautionary principle, if anything, even more important. The purpose of 
the  paper is to assess whether some of the positive effects of the application of the 
precautionary principle in the food-safety domain can be successfully applied to issues of 
international security. We  subsequently elaborate  upon  the practice of the precautionary   MARC HOUBEN 
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principle and the concept of pre-emptive military action. By comparing the two ‘practices’, 
we hope to shed light on the issues mentioned above and provide some arguments that will 
answer the questions raised. The scope of this paper is limited, so it concludes with an agenda 
for further research. 
The concept and practice of the precautionary principle  
The precautionary principle is a key intellectual concept in the field of environmental studies. 
The European Commission has made it a key principle in its food safety  programme. The 
precautionary principle is not really new. The essence of the principle is captured in common-
sense aphorisms such as ‘an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure’, ‘better safe than 
sorry’ or ‘look before you leap’. Consider the following quote from a recent Communication 
from the European Commission: 
The Commission considers that the Community, like other WTO members, has 
the right to establish the level of protection  – particularly of the environment, 
human, animal and plant health  – that it deems appropriate. Applying the 
precautionary principle is a key tenet of its policy, and the choices it makes to this 
end will continue to affect the views it defends internationally, on how this 
principle should be applied (European Commission, 2000). 
The precautionary principle or precautionary approach appears in various descriptions in 
treaties since the middle of the 1980s. The European Commission strives to protect the 
environment and human, animal or plant health.  Accordingly, t he Community has 
consistently endeavoured to achieve a high level of protection in these areas. Although the 
precautionary principle is not explicitly mentioned i n the treaties except in the environmental 
field, its scope is far wider. It covers those specific circumstances where scientific evidence is 
insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and there are indications through preliminary, objective 
scientific evaluation that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially 
dangerous effects on the environment or human, animal or plant health may be inconsistent 
with the chosen level of protection (European Commission, 2000, p. 10). The precautionary 
principle can be applied (invoked) when an activity raises the threat of harm to human health 
or the environment. It is now an established practice that precautionary measures should be 
taken even if some of the inherent cause and effect relationships are not fully established 
scientifically (see Table 1). In this context, the proponent of an activity, rather than the public, 
should bear the burden of proof. 
Table 1. The ‘precautionary principle’ in some international treaties and agreements 
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987 
“Parties to this protocol…determined to protect the ozone layer by taking  precautionary measures 
to control equitably total global emissions of substances that deplete it…” 
The Third North Sea Conference, 1990 
“The participants…will continue to apply the  precautionary principle, that is to take action to avoid 
the potentially damaging impacts of substances that are persistent, toxic and liable to bio accumulate 
even where there is no scientific evidence to prove a causal link between emissions and effects.” 
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992 
“In order to protect the environment the  Precautionary Approach shall be widely applied by states 
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.”   BETTER SAFE THAN SORRY 
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The Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992 
“The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimise the causes of 
climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are no threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, 
taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so 
as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.” 
The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), 1992 
“Community policy on the environment…shall be based on the  precautionary principle and on the 
principles that preventive actions should be taken, that the environmental damage should as a priority 
be rectified at the source and that the polluter should pay.” 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 2000 
“In accordance with the  precautionary approach the objective of this Protocol is to contribute to 
ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living 
modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human 
health and specifically focusing on transboundary movements.” 
The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) 2001 
Precaution, including transparency and public participation, is operationalised throughout the treaty, 
with explicit references in the preamble,  the objective and the provisions for adding POPs and 
determination of best available technologies. The objective states: “ Mindful of the Precautionary 
Approach as set forth in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 
objective of this Convention is to protect human health and the environment from persistent organic 
pollutants”. 
Source: European Environmental Agency (EEA ), 2002. 
 
The crucial question is when  to invoke the precautionary principle. In the European Union, 
the European Commission  – as guarantor of the treaties  – can invoke the precautionary 
principle. The decision to do so should be based on formally established criteria in order to be 
transparent. The practice of precautionary action consists of four essential elements:  
1.   People have a duty to take anticipatory action to prevent harm. If there is a reasonable 
suspicion that something bad  is going to happen, they have an obligation to try to stop it.  
2.   The burden of proving of the  harmlessness of a new technology, process, activity or 
chemical lies with the proponents, not with the general public.  
3.   Before using a new technology, process  or chemical, or starting a new activity, people 
have an obligation to examine ‘a full range of alternatives’ including the alternative of 
doing nothing.  
4.   Decisions applying the precautionary pr inciple must be ‘open, informed and democratic’ 
and ‘must include affected parties’. 
It is up to the risk managers to decide if the precautionary principle should be invoked. In the 
European Union, the European Commission acts as the risk manager. It is, however,  an 
eminently political responsibility to judge what an ‘acceptable level of risk’ is for society. 
Decision-makers who are faced with  an unacceptable risk, scientific uncertainty  or public 
concerns have a duty to find answers (see Box 1). In general, the precautionary principle 
should be considered within a structured approach to the analysis of risk that comprises three 
elements: r isk a ssessment, risk management and risk communication.  This  principle is 
particularly relevant to the  element of risk  management. It consists of two quite distinct 
aspects or constituent parts: the first is the political decision to act or not to act, which is   MARC HOUBEN 
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linked to the factors triggering the recourse to the precautionary principle; and, if the decision 
to act is  affirmative,  the second aspect is how to act,  i.e. the measures resulting from  the 
application of the  precautionary principle. These two elements are discussed in the sections 
that follow. 
Box 1. Risk, uncertainty and ignorance 
The precautionary principle is seen principally as a way to deal with a lack of scientific certainty. A 
basic foundation for our conclusions concerns the nature of scientific certainty itself. There is an 
urgent need for a more complete and systematic basis for thinking about the different ways in which 
scientific uncertainty may pervade regulatory appraisal. First, there is the familiar condition of risk , 
as formally defined  in probability theory. This is where all possible outcomes are known in advance 
and where their relative likelihood can be adequately expressed as probabilities. Where this condition 
prevails, risk assessment is a valid technique that can save lives, prevent damage to the environment 
and provide a robust basis for decision-making. Still, the judgements over what is defined as at risk, 
and over the right balance to strike in decision-making, are necessarily laden with subjective 
assumptions and values. 
 
Under the conditions of uncertainty, as formally defined, the adequate empirical or theoretical basis 
for assigning probabilities to outcomes does not exist. This may be because of the novelty of the 
activities concerned or because of  the  complexity or variability in their contexts. Either way, 
conventional risk assessment is too narrow in scope to be adequate for application under conditions of 
uncertainty. Although techniques such as safety factors, scenario or sensitivity analysis can be useful, 
they do not provide an adequate way to assess the impacts of different options. Here, more than ever, 
judgements about the right balance to strike in decision-making are laden with subjective assumptions 
and values. Often, decision-making is faced with the continual prospect of surprise – when some of 
the possibilities themselves remain unknown. This is the condition formally known as ignorance. 
Even more than uncertainty, this underscores the need for a healthy humility over the sufficiency of 
the available scientific knowledge and, crucially, for an institutional capacity for open reflection on 
the quality and utility of available bodies of knowledge. Once it is acknowledged that the likelihood 
of certain outcomes may not be fully quantifiable or  that certain other possibilities may remain 
entirely unaddressed, then uncertainty and ignorance, rather than mere risk characterise the situation. 
The adoption of robust, transparent and accountable approaches towards the various aspects of risk, 
uncertainty and ignorance can be identified as one crucial means of regaining public confidence in 
regulatory decision-making. 
Source: EEA (2002) with amendments by the author. 
Triggers  for a decision to invoke the precautionary principle  
Once the scientific evaluation has been perfo rmed in the best possible way, it may provide a 
basis for triggering a decision to invoke the precautionary principle. The conclusions of this 
evaluation should show that the desired level of protection for the environment or a 
population group could be jeopardised. The precautionary principle is relevant only in the 
event of a potential risk, even if this risk cannot be fully demonstrated or quantified, nor its 
effects determined because of the insufficiency or inconclusive nature of the scientific data. 
The Commission has confirmed its wish to rely on procedures as transparent as possible and 
to involve all interested parties at the earliest stage. This will assist decision-makers in taking 
legitimate measures  that are likely to achieve the society’s chosen level of health or 
environmental protection. It should, however, be noted that the precautionary principle can, 
under no circumstances, be used to justify the adoption of arbitrary decisions. Concrete 
triggers are: the identification of potentially negative effects; scientific evaluation, comprising   BETTER SAFE THAN SORRY 
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a risk assessment; and scientific uncertainty.
1 The appropriate response in a given situation is 
thus the result of a political decision, a function of the risk level that is ‘acceptable’ to the 
society on which the risk  is imposed  ( European Commission, 2000,  p.  16). The European 
Commission is convinced that measures based on the precautionary principle should comply 
with the basic principles for all other legislation. Where action is deemed necessary, measures 
based on the precautionary principle should be, inter alia: 
•  proportional to the chosen level of protection. The measure envisaged must make it 
possible to achieve the appropriate level of protection. Measures based on the 
precautionary principle must not be disproportionate to the desired level of protection  nor 
aim at a zero-level of risk. 
•  non-discriminatory in their application. The principle of non-discrimination means that 
comparable situations should not be treated differently nor should different situations all 
be treated in the same way, unless there are objective grounds for doing so. 
•  consistent with the measures already adopted in similar circumstances or using similar 
approaches. 
•  based on an examination of the potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action. A 
comparison must be made between the most likely positive or negative consequences of 
the envisaged action with the consequences of inaction in terms of the overall cost to the 
Community, both in the long and short term. The measures envisaged must produce an 
overall advantage as regards to reducing risks to an acceptable level. Examination of the 
pros and cons cannot be reduced to an economic cost-benefit analysis. It is wider in scope 
and includes non-economic considerations. 
•  subject to review, in the light of new scientific data.  
•  capable of assigning responsibility for producing the scientific evidence necessary for a 
more comprehensive risk assessment (European Commission, 2000, p. 4). 
The European Union Commissioner for Health, Mr. David Byrne, noted  in an explanatory 
speech in 2000 on the precautionary principle in the food safety domain that,  
The Commission’s interest in this principle arises from its role as a risk manager. 
It had identified that the precautionary principle was evolving in different policy 
areas in such a manner that the principle itself was becoming misunderstood, 
leading to potential intentional or unintentional abuse…For the precautionary 
principle to be relevant, two preconditions have to be in place. The first 
precondition is that the potentially dangerous effects deriving from a 
phenomenon, product or process have been identified; the second precondition is 
that scientific evaluation does not allow the risk to be determined with sufficient 
certainty (Byrne, 2002). 
But, as the commissioner made clear, the European Union is not seeking to create a risk-free 
society:  “The European Commission does not believe that the precautionary principle is a 
substitute or excuse for seeking zero risk. Zero risk is rarely found, and in the vast majority of 
cases we are in the field of managing and controlling risk ” (Byrne, 2002). A salient aspect of 
the risk management process by the European Commission is that the burden of proof has 
been inverted  – it is not the Commission that has to prove the possible negative effects of a 
                                                   
1 A risk assessment usually consists of four elements: hazard identification, hazard characterisation, appraisal of 
exposure and risk characterisation. Scientific uncertainty is usually the sum of five parameters of the scientific 
method: the variable chosen, the measurements made, the samples drawn, the models used and the causal 
relationship employed. Scientific uncertainty may also arise from a controversy surrounding existing data or the 
lack of some relevant data.   MARC HOUBEN 
  6 
food additive  but it is the actor intending to bring  it  on the market who has to prove the 
absence of negative effects.  
An inverse burden of proof 
Community rules and those of many  non-member countries enshrine the principle of prior 
approval before placing certain products, such as drugs, pesticides or food additives on the 
market. This is one way of applying the precautionary principle, by shifting responsibility for 
producing scientific evidence. This applies in particular to those substances deemed  a priori 
hazardous or  those that are potentially hazardous at a certain level of absorption. In this case 
the legislator, by way of precaution, has clearly reversed the burden of proof by requiring that 
the substances be deemed hazardous until proven otherwise. Hence, it is up to the business 
community to carry out the scientific work needed to evaluate the risk. As long as the human 
health risk cannot be evaluated with sufficient certainty, the legislator is not legally entitled to 
authorise use of the substance, unless exceptionally for test purposes. Measures based on the 
precautionary principle may assign responsibility for producing the scientific evidence 
necessary for a comprehensive risk evaluation. The decision-making procedure should be 
transparent and should involve all interested parties as early as possible and to the  greatest 
reasonable extent. Not only  has the burden of proof switched sides, the nature of the proof 
required has also changed in this application.  
This concludes the  brief overview of the precautionary principle.  Further information and 
more detailed accounts  are referenced in the bibliography. The next section of the paper 
considers the concept of pre-emptive military action, its key notions and concepts. 
A new strategic condition 
With the successful conclusion of the war in Iraq, a new, great, strategic debate has begun in 
earnest. After the debate over ‘humanitarian’ intervention in the 1990s, this decade will see a 
debate on the  meaning and the practice of pre-emptive military action. In early 2002, 
President Bush ordered his national security team to rewrite the national security strategy so 
that it would justify initiating pre-emptive military campaigns against groups or nations that 
the President believes pose a threat of a future attack against America or its allies. This left 
many uncomfortable with the idea of President Bush giving himself carte blanche to make 
any military intervention he thinks necessary, without seeking outside approval. President 
Bush gave evidence of his position in a speech at the graduation exercise of West Point, the 
US top military institution, where he stated that he was not prepared to wait “too long” for a 
threat to materialise: 
We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put 
our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and 
then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will 
have waited too long. The only path to safety is the path of action…Our security 
will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for pre-
emptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives 
(President Bush, speech at West Point Military Academy, 2002). 
The idea of pre-emptive action is neither a new nor an alien concept to European 
governments. They apply the precautionary approach within their societies with vigour and 
imagination, as seen in the example of the extensive security precautions in force during EU 
summits, in which possible rioters are picked up pre-emptively (whether one approves of this 
practice is a different matter, the fact is that precautionary measures are being taken). The 
Netherlands has  adopted a  regulation that a llows police officers to search individuals   BETTER SAFE THAN SORRY 
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preventively, that is, without formally being identified as a suspect. The attacks on America 
have made the new strategic condition very clear, which is the vulnerability of our societies 
coupled with the fact that determined individuals can  obtain weapons with which they can 
inflict significant, irreversible or even existential damage to entire societies. It is the 
realisation of the vulnerability of our open and high-tech democracies and the scale of 
potential d amage that can be inflicted upon them that forces governments on both sides of the 
Atlantic to re-think their options and responsibilities, along with how their actions must be 
embedded in existing beliefs, conventions and principles. 
Pre-emption, prevention and anticipation 
Michael Walzer develops the concept of ‘anticipation’ in international law in  Just and Unjust 
Wars (1977).  According to Walzer’s account, “ Both individuals and states can rightfully 
defend themselves against violence that is imminent but not actual; they can fire the first shots 
if they know themselves about to be attacked. This is a right recognised in domestic law and 
also in the legalist paradigm for international society. In most legal accounts, however, it is 
severely restricted. Indeed, once one has stated the restrictions, it is no longer clear whether 
the right has any substance at all” (Walzer, 1977, p. 74). Walzer sketches a spectrum of 
anticipation: at one end, pre-emption is a reflex action, a raising of one’s arms at the very last 
minute, in a necessary manner; at the other end it is preventive war, an attack that responds to 
a distant danger,  in a manner  that exercises foresight and free choice. Preventive war 
presupposes some standard against which danger is to be measured.  This standard does not 
exist, except in the ‘mind’s eye’. In the words of Francis Bacon, “A just fear of an imminent 
danger, though no blow be given, is a lawful cause of war”. Surely, in some instances it is 
simply stupid to wait for any other to inflict harm. In some cases, one has no other option than 
to protect oneself, when one can ‘see it coming’.  
With the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological or chemical) the 
chance that such a weapon will be used against innocent citizens has increased. Today the 
possible threats to our societies have risen to such a level that one wonders whether it is still 
acceptable. A threat results from someone’s ability inflict harm and his/her intention to do so. 
The situation in which a country possesses the means to inflict enormous or even irreversible 
damage to national or regional stability, and whose intentions are unclear, is a huge problem. 
On the one hand we can sincerely ask whether we can afford to run the risk not to act, but on 
the other hand ‘if the intention is unknown’, military action cannot be justified. This makes 
the intelligence appreciation of the intention of a possible opponent increasingly important. At 
the same time there is an enormous risk of a politicisation of the intelligence appreciation. 
The reasons why the intention to harm must be ‘manifest’ is pointed  out in the next section.  
Hans Boutellier, a Dutch criminologist, comes to a similar conclusion in a recently published 
study, “Perhaps the most essential insight of the reaction to terror is the desire we may feel to 
understand the evil, but that we can hardly allow ourselves to do so. We cannot excuse it 
because the consequences are simply too great. It is this idea which is characteristic of  the 
moral consciousness under post-modern conditions” (Boutellier, 2002, p. 13). 
A historical precedent: the Six Day War 
Walzer uses the Six Day War as a historical precedent to illustrate the concept of anticipation 
and concludes that the  first  Israeli strike was a clear case of legitimate anticipation. Actual 
fighting between Israel and Egypt began on 5 June 1967, after the first Israeli strike. In the 
early hours of the war, the Israelis did not acknowledge that they had sought the advantage of 
surprise, but the deception was n ot maintained. In fact, they believed themselves justified in   MARC HOUBEN 
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attacking first because of the dramatic events of the previous weeks. The Egyptians believed 
that the founding of Israel in 1948 had been unjust, that the state had no rightful existence and 
hen ce, that it could be attacked at any time. In a major speech on 29 May, President Gamal 
Abdel Nasser of Egypt announced that if war came, the Egyptian goal would be nothing less 
than the destruction of Israel. On 30  May, King Hussein of Jordan flew to Cairo to sign a 
treaty placing the Jordanian army under Egypt’s command in event of war, thus associating 
himself with the Egyptian purpose. Syria had  already  agreed to such an arrangement and 
several days later Iraq joined the alliance. The Israelis struck on the day after the Iraqi 
announcement. There was a basic asymmetry in the structure of  the opposing forces: the 
Egyptians could deploy their large army of long-term regulars on the Israeli border and keep 
it there indefinitely; the Israelis could only counter their deployment by mobilising reserve 
formations,  though reservists could not be kept in uniform for very long. Egypt could 
therefore stay in a defensive position while Israel would have to attack unless the crisis was 
defused diplomatically. 
The initial Israeli response was not as similarly  determined as that of Egypt but, for domestic 
political reasons having to do in part with the democratic character of the state, was hesitant 
and confused. Israel’s leaders sought a political resolution  to the crisis, which they did not 
have the political strength or support to effect. Meanwhile, an intense fear spread throughout 
the country. Based on this example, Walzer  (1997) establishes his precautionary axiom to 
international security wherein: 
States may use military force in the face of threats of war, whenever failure to do 
so would seriously risk their territorial integ rity or political independence…Under 
such circumstances it can fairly be said that they have been forced to fight and 
that they are the victims of aggression. Since there are no police upon whom they 
can call, the moment at which states are forced to fight probably comes sooner 
than it would for individuals in a settled domestic society. But if we imagine an 
unstable society, like the ‘wild  West’ of American fiction, the analogy can be 
restated: a state under threat is like an individual hunted by an enemy who has 
announced his intention of killing or injuring him. Surely such a person may 
surprise his hunter, if he is able to do  so…The line between legitimate and 
illegitimate first strike is not going to be drawn at the point of imminent attack but 
at the point of sufficient threat (Walzer, 1977, pp. 81-85). 
An asymmetry in the structure of forces sets a time limit on diplomatic efforts that would 
have no relevance to conflicts involving other sorts of states and armies. There are threats 
with which no nation can be expected to tolerate. And that acknowledgement is an important 
part of our understanding of aggression (Walzer, 1977, p. 85). 
Preconditions for pre-emptive military action 
The line between a legitimate and an illegitimate first strike is not going to be drawn at the 
point of imminent attack but at the point of  sufficient threat. Walzer uses this necessarily 
vague phrase to cover three things: a) a manifest intent to injure; b) a degree of active 
preparation that makes that intent a positive danger; and, c) a general situation in which 
waiting or doing anything other than fighting greatly magnifies the risk. It is impossible to 
specify the time span; it is the time span in which it is possible to feel threatened, within 
which one can still make choices. Wars undoubtedly have long political and moral pre-
histories. But anticipation needs to be understood within a narrower time frame.    BETTER SAFE THAN SORRY 
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In an article for The New York Times (17 June 2002), David Sanger develops four standard s to 
which he intends to hold the US president accountable in case of a pre-emptive military  strike 
(paraphrased): 
1)  The less the immediate and direct the threat is against America, the weaker the case  is for 
pre-emptive military action. The administration must make it clear that force will be a last 
resort, not its principal anti-proliferation tool.  
2)  Whether the United States strikes first or retaliates, Congressional leaders of both parties 
should be consulted and listened to before military  action is taken. Ideally, the president 
should ask for a vote of support from Congress. America’s allies should also be consulted 
before any offensive military action. 
3)  The government must be prepared to justify any offensive attack on another country after 
it occurs. Both the nation and the world expect this, and they will judge the 
administration’s actions on the quality of the proof it can assemble to show that something 
deadly was about to happen without immediate intervention. 
4)  It is difficult to think of any circumstance under which the United States could be justified 
in using any kind of nuclear weapon in a pre-emptive strike. While the administration may 
find it strategically important not to acknowledge that fact, nuclear weapons should never 
be regarded as just another bigger, more effective bomb. 
Pre-emptive military action is problematic because the means have to be reconciled with the 
ends. Protecting democracy is an ultimate political concern and responsibility, but the way it 
is done is equally important. There are a number of legitimate concerns that can be voiced 
from a democratic perspective, including the transparency of the decision-making process, the 
justification of the d ecision/action taken  and the issue of the executive being accountable to 
the electorate. With regard to the precautionary principle, these concerns are met by a 
developed and detailed procedure that prescribes the application of the principle. As a matter 
of fact, the procedural aspect constitutes an essential characteristic of the legitimate use of the 
principle. Are these concerns relevant in the case of pre-emptive military action?  We assert 
that they are, but there are a number of caveats that will be elaborated below. One issue is the 
element of surprise. This is clearly an important consideration in any military strike and this 
consideration could explain why no information is given before a pre-emptive military strike 
actually takes place. The issue is then whether the absence of information ex ante makes the 
obligation to give clear and unambiguous evidence ex post even more important, an obligation 
that should be respected at all times. If an administration conducts a pre-emptive strike, such a 
strike can only become legitimate on the basis of the evidence provided by the actor. The 
following sections highlight some of the similarities as well as some of the fundamental 
differences between the two policy practices of the precautionary principle and pre-emptive 
military action. 
Precaution and pre-emption: similarities 
Prima facie, a number of similarities exist between the precautionary principle and pre-
emptive action.  The aims of invoking the precautionary principle and the doctrine of pre-
emptive military strike are the same – the defence or protection of a society and its citizens 
against an unknown danger. The application of the precautionary principle rests on three core 
conditions: a) regulatory inaction may lead to non-negligible harm; b) there i s a lack of 
certainty as to the cause and effect relationship; and, c) under such circumstances, regulatory 
inaction is not justified (cf. Woolcock, 2002, p. 1). These three core conditions constitute the 
trigger of ‘non-negligible risk’. The trigger for the application of the doctrine of pre-emptive 
military strike is ‘sufficient threat’ (Walzer, 2002). Pre-emptive military action is justified if   MARC HOUBEN 
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three core conditions are met: a) a manifest intention to harm; b) an active preparation; and, c) 
any course of action other than using force aggravates the risks disproportionately. The 
application of the precautionary principle and the concept of  pre-emptive military action 
follow a similar pattern and result in a situation in which inaction is the problematic, even 
irresponsible course of action.  
Some observers would claim that the risks operative in the security domain are of a 
fundamentally different nature and scope than those in the environmental domain. Countering 
that line of thinking, one should consider  the similarities between  ‘bio-terror’, which is 
clearly in the security realm, and ‘bio-error’, which is not in the security domain. It is easily 
conceivable that the  fallout from both examples may be of the same apocalyptic scale. The 
spectrum of risks, threats and consequences for society are roughly the same for both policy 
domains. But there are fundamental differences too. 
Precaution and pre-emption: fundamental differences 
1) The nature of the (re-)action. The fundamental difference between the decision to invoke 
the precautionary principle and pre-emptive military action lies in the nature of the act. 
Invoking the precautionary principle is a regulatory act of governance. Resorting to pre-
emptive military action is an act of sovereignty. The power to  invoke the precautionary 
principle on behalf of the European Union is delegated to the European Commission, a non-
elected body empowered to invoke such a  principle. It also acts as Europe’s prime risk 
manager, deciding on the acceptability of certain risk  levels. With regard to pre-emptive 
military action, we speak of a military intervention against individuals or a regime in a non-
member, sovereign country. Such an act constitutes, in international law (if not qualified), an 
act of aggression.  In the US, o nly the p resident, as an elected official responsible to the 
people, can decide whether or not to strike pre-emptively, with or without the consent of 
Congress.  
2) The level of proof. The European Environment Agency (EEA) study in 2002 differentiates 
among various levels of proof (see Table 2). The level the European Commission uses when 
applying the precautionary principle is the second least stringent. Nevertheless, it is (almost) 
evident that, if such a grave action as a pre-emptive military action is planned, the level of 
proof required can only be the most stringent, i.e. it must be ‘waterproof’. If pre-emptive 
military action is considered, the information available must prove that the threat is ‘beyond 
all reasonable doubt’. The quality of the evidence will directly affect the perceived legitimacy 
of the action. A critical problem is that there are no objective standards with which one can 
judge information. Deciding when information is ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ is, in the case 
of the precautionary principle and the EU,  it is a matter of scientific interpretation, and in the 
case of a pre-emptive military action, a matter of intelligence appreciation. This points 
directly back to Walzer’s differentiation between justified and unjustified anticipatory 
military action. The difference between the two appears to lie exactly in the ‘level of proof’, 
i.e. in the former case the intentions are manifest (known beyond all reasonable doubt), in the 
latter these are unknown or uncertain.   BETTER SAFE THAN SORRY 
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Table 2. Different levels of proof for different purposes: some illustrations 
Description  Examples 
‘Beyond all reasonable doubt’  Criminal law; Swedish chemical law, 1973 (for evidence of 
‘safety’ from manufacturers) 
‘Balance of evidence’  Intergovernmental panel on climate change, 1995 and 2001 
‘Reasonable grounds for concern’  European Commission Communication on the p recautionary 
principle 
‘Scientific suspicion of risk’  Swedish chemical law, 1973, for the  evidence required  by 
regulators to take precautionary action on  the  potential 
harmful effects of substances 
Source: EEA, 2002. 
 
3) The burden of proof. A key characteristic of the precautionary principle is that the burden 
of proof is inverted. The party proposing to introduce a food additive into the market is 
required to give evidence of risk levels. These parties are generally willing to comply and 
cooperate with the European Commission because they have an economic interest to do so. 
The European Commission has to be convinced of the absence of risk, as it represents a 
‘community of consumers’. In the case of pre-emptive military action, the burden of proof is 
with the actor contemplating the pre-emptive strike. The actor intending to strike must make it 
clear that the other party poses a sufficient threat,  thus  legitimising  the action. The  actor 
contemplating  such  pre-emptive action can ask the other party to give evidence of  their 
intentions and capabilities, but these are often hard to verify, since “prudent rulers assume 
malign intentions” as Walzer noted. Nor can one expect the other  party to be cooperative.
2 
Thus the burden of proof is with the actor engaging in the pre-emptive strike. 
4) Ex ante versus ex post justification. In the application of the precautionary principle, the 
justification for invoking it is always given  ex ante. Information is shared with all the parties 
involved and the decision is not only explained, but the scientific evidence is presented, as is 
the weighing of the options. In the case of pre-emptive military action, the justification is 
likely to be given after the action has been executed. This is related to a point elaborated 
below: the element of surprise. When acting in a pre-emptive mode, surprise is considered to 
have a tactical advantage. There is no legal requirement obliging sovereign states to present 
evidence. But, as the previously quoted Sanger asserts, “The nation and the world…will judge 
the administration’s actions on the quality of the proof it can assemble to show that something 
deadly was about to happen without immediate intervention” (Sanger, 2002). Counter-
intuitive as it may seem, the operational value of ex ante justification is perhaps even greater. 
It contributes to the legitimacy of the action and, if applied consistently, may have a deterring 
effect.  
The trade-off between ‘transparency’ and ‘surprise’ 
In the calculus of strategy, the transparency of a decision and the surprise that the decision is 
likely to generate are thought to be zero-sum related: the more open one is about ones 
intentions and possible decision,  the less likely one is to surprise the opponent. By being 
transparent, one gives away an important tactical advantage. Although the element of surprise 
is an established principle of war, the Six Day War and the Iraq war have shown that the 
                                                   
2 It was interesting to note that the US administration repeatedly challenged Saddam Hussein to prove the 
absence of any weapons of mass destruction and production facilities capable of producing WMDs in the lead-up 
to the Iraq war. As was expected, Saddam Hussein did not comply with US demands.   MARC HOUBEN 
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operational value of surprise is limited. Again, this may seem counter-intuitive, but the 
operational value of transparency is greater than one would expect. The operational/tactical 
value of transparency has  both a direct and an indirect aspect. The direct aspect is its 
communicative value. As in deterrence, transparency – here understood as the disclosure of 
information coupled with the effective communication of an intention – can make a potential 
opponent or target of a pre-emptive military strike change  his mind. The indirect aspect of 
transparency  hinges on the obligation that the legitimacy of the operation must be established. 
In the case of the  precautionary  principle, this follows as a consequence from a correctly 
applied doctrine or procedure. We believe that this is operative in the case of pre-emptive 
military action too, wherein disclosing information to the public will convince it of the need 
to act and bolster support for pre-emptive action, rally international support and attract offers 
of assistance. A key question that arises is whether the element of surprise justifies the 
postponement of proof. Being fully transparent about one’s  intention to act may induce the 
required change of policy on the other side, without recourse to armed force.  
‘Maintaining’ versus ‘restoring’ the status quo 
Underlying both the precautionary principle and the practice of pre-emptive military action is 
the assumption of a status quo that carries an acceptable level of risk. In the case of the 
precautionary principle,  when there  is a threat that will increase the risk level, action is 
required. The precautionary principle is a sort of barrier that can be raised or a gate that can be 
closed in order to maintain the current level of risk in the status quo. This is different from the  
international security domain, where the risk level may increase factually (see Table 3). The 
risk level is also increased if a third party threatens harm. It is then up to the sovereign state to 
decide and act upon that information. In the international domain it is not possible to close 
any gates or  raise any barriers beforehand. If a changed risk level is considered to be 
unacceptable, then action is required to redress the balance of risk and to restore the status 
quo. 
Table 3. Maintaining versus restoring the status quo 
  Risk level  Action  Status quo 
Precautionary 
principle 
May change in the future 
(potentiality) 
Precautionary principle 
invoked 
Maintained 
Pre-emptive action  Has changed  
(factually or perceived) 
Pre-emptive military action  Restored 
 
The precautionary principle and issues of international security 
In the previous section, the fundamental differences between the precautionary principle and 
the doctrine of pre-emptive military action have been explained. Although the application of 
the precautionary principle to questions of international security falls short on at least two 
accounts, it is highly useful as a benchmark and analogy. First, there is  the fact that the nature 
of precautionary measures and that of  pre-emptive military action differs fundamentally: one 
is an act of governance and the other is an act of sovereignty. The former can be executed by 
any official mandated to do so,  whereas the former can  only  be executed by  an elected 
official. Secondly, the  time of supplying the evide nce  to  justify the action differs. The 
invocation of the precautionary principle is made legitimate through transparency and by the 
provision of information before the act is executed. Further, the demanding party, e.g. the 
food industry, has an economic interest to fully cooperate and will therefore do so . Scientific 
evidence of threats and risks is concentrated in grey areas: we do not know the exact level of   BETTER SAFE THAN SORRY 
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risk  and therefore we create a margin of safety in which the other party  has to come up with 
evidence to prove that we need not worry. 
In the instance of a pre-emptive military strike, however, the stakes are potentially higher. It 
may well be that a state is dealing with another state, groups or individuals that pose a very 
significant, even irreversible or existential threat to its society and citizens. The idea that the 
opponent potentially possesses the capability to inflict irreversible damage and that their 
intent is unknown, immediately creates a very awkward situation. The element of surprise is 
often cited as crucial. In the example of Iraq, the element of surprise was completely lost – 
and it can be questioned whether this element was indeed that important. Perhaps, for long-
term viability and survivability, it is better to give the proof  ex ante. This has a deterring 
effect and may invite the party involved to cooperate. Whether ‘sufficient threat’ still requires 
a UN Security Council mandate is a critical question. Self-defence is a legitimate act by any 
sovereign state and requires no prior consent from the UN Security Council. Walzer used a 
spectrum to illustrate the different variations in which pre-emptive strikes originate : on the 
one extreme is an action that is a last moment reflex and on the other extreme is an action that 
is one of an ticipated self-defence. In principle, sovereign states have the right to defend 
themselves; thus, the establishment of ‘sufficient threat’ is a sovereign decision. No UN-
mandate is therefore legally required prior to the action. Nevertheless, when a party has made  
the effort to obtain a UN Security Council mandate,  the legitimacy of the action  increases 
significantly. 
The key threshold for both the application of the precautionary principle and the doctrine for a 
pre-emptive military strike is the legitimacy of the action. It is safe to state that neither pre-
emptive military action nor the use of the precautionary principle inherently ‘possesses’ 
legitimacy. Legitimacy is always ‘established’ through a correct application, from which 
legitimacy follows as a consequence. However pedantic this may sound to legal experts, there 
is a certain  value to making a distinction between acts that possess legitimacy and acts that 
must be made legitimate by the way  in which  they are carried out. The application of  the 
precautionary principle is ‘made’ legitimate by presenting elaborate facts before the principle 
is invoked and by making the information available to all parties concerned (transparency). 
Invoking the precautionary principle per se is not legitimate. In the scenario of a pre-emptive 
strike, a single actor establishes the legitimacy of pre-emptive military action at one point or 
another. He or she perceives the triggering condition of ‘sufficient threat’ to  have been met, 
which  is a subjective condition (‘in the mind’s eye’ as Walzer says). A pre-emptive military 
strike is never a priori legal or legitimate. The demands on an actor engaging in a pre-emptive 
strike must be severe. The actor must  ex post ‘make’ his action legitimate by providing 
convincing evidence – beyond all reasonable doubt – after he has carried out the pre-emptive 
action. If he fails to do so, or fails to meet the acceptable level of proof, his act must be 
condemned as illegitimate and illegal by a representative international body, e.g. the UN 
Security Council. 
A comparison between the precautionary principle and the doctrine of pre-emptive military 
strike is presented  below in Table 4 . To summarise, a fundamental difference between the two 
lies in the nature of the act: invoking the precautionary principle is an act of governance, 
whereas  striking pre-emptively is an act of sovereignty. Further, the burden of proof, in the 
case of the precautionary principle is inverted and proof must be delivered  ex ante. In the 
doctrine of pre-emption, the element of surprise is important; the burden of proof is with the 
administration but proof must be given ex post of the action. The key to the doctrine of a pre-
emptive military strike is the notion of proving  ‘sufficient threat’. Two aspects of this notion 
are of crucial importance. First, the establishment of a sufficient threat as an objective fact is   MARC HOUBEN 
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very hard, perhaps even impossible to do. Risk  may be in the eye of the beholder – ‘if 
something is perceived to be real, it is real in its consequences’ – thus if it is ‘sufficient’, it 
may provoke a reaction. Second, the predicament of our time is that states and individuals 
have the means to inflict such a level of harm that it may result in irreversible damage or 
instability to the international system. The situation  in  which one knows that another party 
possesses the means to inflict such damage but their intention is unknown, is problematic. 
Such a situation may be perceived to constitute  so much threat that no other option is 
available  except  to take r esponsibility  for self-protection  and act pre-emptively. In that 
scenario, we witness a divergence  between the ‘unknown intention’ and the ‘manifest 
intention’.  Whether a truly unknown intention conforms to the requirement of the highest 
level of proof is an interesting question. 
Table  4. Overview of some of the differences and similarities between the precautionary 
principle and pre-emptive military action 
  Precautionary principle  Pre-emptive military action  
Aim  Protection  Protection 
Constitutional obligation to 
protect? 
The  European Commission is the 
guarantor of the treaties. 
The US p resident is obliged to 
defend the Constitution. 
Risk manager  
Who  decides the ‘acceptable’ 
levels of risk and protection? 
The European Commission  The US president  
The n ature of the action   An act of governance where the 
national and European 
Parliaments are not involved 
An act of sovereignty possibly 
requiring the consent of 
Congress  
Burden of proof (ex ante)  The proponents of a new 
technology/food additive; they are 
likely to cooperate and have an 
economic interest to do so. 
The groups or nations 
perceived as a threat/risk; they 
are highly unlikely to 
cooperate and have a political 
interest not to do so. 
Burden of proof (ex post)  Not required  Required, by the acting 
administration 
Level of proof  ‘Reasonable doubts for concern’  ‘Beyond all reasonable doubt’ 
Trigger  Non-negligible risk  Sufficient threat 
Core conditions for 
application: 
a)  Regulatory  inaction threatens 
to lead to non-negligible 
harm; 
b)  A lack of certainty as to the 
cause and effect relationship; 
c)  Regulatory inaction is not 
justified. 
a) Manifest hostile intent; 
b) Active preparation; 
c) Action other than war that 
aggravates the risks 
unacceptably. 
Source  Scientific evaluation and 
‘uncertainty’ 
Intelligence appreciation of the 
‘threat’ 
Transparency of the 
evaluation 
Maximal   Unknown 
Operational criteria     
Proportional  Required  Unknown 
Non-discriminatory  Required  Difficult 
Consistent  Required  Difficult 
Cost-benefit analysis  Required  Likely 
 
Review mechanism  Required  Unknown 
   BETTER SAFE THAN SORRY 
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Is ‘double’ accountability for pre-emptive military action required?  
The supply of evidence before pre-emptive action commences has the strategic advantage of 
its deterrent effect and may invite the  other  party involved to cooperate. A pre-emptive 
military strike is a surprise attack on a country that will surprise not only the targeted country 
but may also surprise the allies of the actor. The information that triggers the action is highly 
classified and is only revealed after the action is completed to a limited number of friends, 
behind closed doors. The core of this action is the targeted application of force aimed at 
neutralising or destroying an opponent. A number of strict preconditions apply to the 
justification of this action: 
1)  Evidence supporting the need for precautionary intervention should be made public before 
the action is executed, as  well as the decision that  the threat posed is considered to 
constitute an unacceptable level of risk for the society and citizens involved. Although this 
is an executive decision, the consent of the national parliament should be sought. 
2)  The intention to execute a precautionary intervention  should be clearly and 
unambiguously communicated to the target country,  including a timeline and additional 
demands. 
3)  After the precautionary intervention is executed, a ‘double’ accountability is enforced, 
both to  the p arliament at home and to the international community at large, e.g. the 
Security Council of the United Nations. Legitimacy must be established, since it follows 
as a logical consequence from the proper application of the principle and the doctrine. 
Pre-emptive military action can only be justified in those instances where an actor can supply 
convincing evidence for his/her action, before or after the action has taken place. This is a 
very important obligation because the issue of democratic accountability must be articulated 
and answered in each and  every  case. The point to be addressed here is whether this 
obligation changes if the information is supplied before or after the action. The obligation to 
open up the books after an action has been executed may be even more important than when 
the information is supplied beforehand. The difference is in the number of stakeholders 
directly and indirectly affected. If the information is only supplied after the action has taken 
place, one could then conceive of a requirement that we could call ‘double’ accountability: an 
obligation to account to the public at home ( e.g. a national parliament) and a second 
obligation to account to the international community at large (e.g. the UN). 
Is this a necessary, realistic and/or desirable demand? We argue that it is. It may well be the 
case that conducting a pre-emptive military attack without supplying adequate evidence of the 
threat is as shocking to the rule of international law (and indeed international stability) as 
genocide is. If the information – and the proof legitimising the action – can be made available 
only ex post facto (which is a realistic scenario), then double accountability is called for. If the 
information is made available before the action commences, this obligation is less clear. But 
in that situation the UN Security Council is likely to be involved and either will or will not 
support the action. 
The one problem that will perhaps prove fatal is the demand for consistency. If the concept of 
precautionary intervention is not applied consistently, the deterrence effect will be negated 
and the actor may even lose his/her credibility. Finding ways to counter this pitfall is an 
important element of further research, but  in reality  it  may be too wayward to conform to 
political rules and principles. One way forward is to agree to a procedure that embed s the use 
of precautionary measures in the security  domain firmly in democratic structures and 
practices.   MARC HOUBEN 
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An agenda for further research 
This paper has aimed at assessing whether the precautionary principle can be applied to 
questions of international security. So far, we have answered this question only in an indirect 
way. The conclusion now seems to be that the precautionary principle, as the European Union 
applies it in environmental and food safety regulations, cannot be applied to issues of 
international security. But, as previously stated, it is useful as a benchmark and an analogy. 
The comparison between the use of the  precautionary principle and the use of pre-emptive 
military action has been very instructive because it enables us to see more clearly the 
democratic demands that must be met before, dur ing and after the action. If one takes into 
account only the operational requirements, it is likely that the legitimacy of the action will be 
questionable. The surprising results are that the spectrum of risks in the environmental and 
food safety domain is of the same scale as those  in the security domain. But precautionary 
action is an act of governance initiated by a bureaucracy, whereas pre-emptive military action 
is an act of sovereignty initiated by a democratically elected head of state. As stated in  the 
introduction, the scope of this paper is limited, so it is confined to giving an overview of the 
issue and pointing out some of the key aspects. The issue addressed in this paper merits a full, 
book-length inquiry. The key questions in the debate concerning ‘precautionary military 
measures’ include: 
•  How does one determine whether and to what extent ‘sufficient threat’ exists? 
•  Assuming this is possible , what precautionary action is justified?  
•  How should the thresholds for risk and the costs of  inaction be determined – and who 
should make these decisions? 
•  How does risk management relate to or meet the demands of good governance? 
As an afterthought, this outline of a research agenda on p recautionary military measures may 
lead to some questions on  precautionary  action. Is it, for instance, ever possible  or even 
desirable to leave risk management to a bureaucracy (e.g. the European Commission)? 
Shouldn’t it be a principle of good governance that the decision on the acceptability of risks 
and threats be and remain a political act, taken only by those actors who are accountable, 
either directly to the electorate or to a democratically elected assembly of representatives? 
Finally, there is, in our observation, a consensus among the US and Europe concerning two 
basic premises: 1) the exposure of the Western world, coupled with the scale of potential 
damage, may make governmental inaction in some  instances irresponsible and unjustified; 
and  2) precautionary measures are here to stay. Tensions in transatlantic relations have arisen 
and will continue over the issues of who bears the burden of proof, the level of proof needed 
(before and after the operation has taken place) and the modalities of the intervention. If these 
tensions become unmanageable, a situation will d evelop in which the US will fight the fights 
that  it wants to and Europe will fight the fights that it considers worthwhile. Only if both 
partners cooperate and inform each other of their intentions and actions  does the Western 
world stand a chance of winning the war on terrorism.    17 
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